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Abstract 
In this paper, we evaluate alternate commercial structures for an integrated CCS-EOR project where the source of CO2 is a coal-fired 
power plant, and the CO2 is transported via a dedicated pipeline to an oil field where the CO2 is injected for EOR. We evaluate 
alternative contract types that link the involved entities in light of exogenous market risks, such as the fluctuating price of oil 
recovered. The choice of the contract type determines who would bear the risks along the value chain, and the incentives that the risk 
allocation produces fixes the total project value. We see that the fixed price contracts have weaknesses in terms of ex-post 
insolvencies and poor incentive structures that result in a sub-optimal decision-making by the involved entities. The risk-sharing 
offered by the indexed price contracts reduces the likelihood of ex-post insolvency and provides incentives to each entity to optimize 
the total project value. 
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved 
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1. Introduction 
In 2008, leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) committed to launch 20 large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
demonstration projects by 2010 with the goal of beginning broad deployment of CCS by 2020 [4]. Among other things, 
the criteria developed for the launch of these large-scale CCS projects specify that they should be integrated projects, 
i.e. the project should include the entire CCS value chain of capture, transport and storage of CO2 [4].  We evaluate an 
integrated CCS project where the source of CO2 is a coal-fired power plant, and the CO2 is transported via a dedicated 
pipeline to an oil field where it is injected for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and subsequently stored. In integrated CCS 
projects, the different parts of the value chain are linked through a commercial structure that determines the ownership, 
financial and operating structure for the involved entities. For example, the entire value chain could be owned by a 
single company, or, alternatively, each component of the chain could be owned by a separate company with the 
relations between them specified in a contract for delivery of the CO2.  We evaluate alternative contract terms that link 
the involved entities in light of exogenous market risks, such as the fluctuating price of oil recovered. 
The specific ownership structure we study is where the power plant and the oil field are owned by separate 
companies and the pipeline is jointly owned by the two companies.  In this ownership structure we find that even 
though the overall integrated project has a positive net present value (NPV), the power plant company would have a 
negative NPV without any internal revenue transfer. We evaluate two contract types where the oil field company pays 
the power plant company for the CO2 delivery as per a fixed CO2 contract price, or, alternatively, a CO2 contract price 
that is indexed to the oil price. Section 3 of this paper identifies the contracts that have the following key features: 
a) Contracts should distribute the aggregate project value between the involved entities so that it is profitable for each 
entity to go-ahead with the project. 
b) Contracts should offer risk allocation among the entities to reduce the uncertainty on the ex-post desirability of the 
ex-ante negotiated contract terms. 
In the fixed price CO2 contracts the oil field company bears all the oil price risk and hence there is a high likelihood 
that ex-post if the price of oil changes then it would not be profitable for the oil field company to continue on the ex-
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ante negotiated contract terms.  Indexed price contracts distribute the oil price risk between both companies and thus 
reduce the likelihood of ex-post dissatisfaction with the contract terms. 
In Section 4, we show that if the project operations are optimized in response to the change in risk factors such as the 
oil price then the overall project value will be maximized. We see that lowering the CO2 capture rate in a low oil price 
environment can save up to $156 million. This is because at a low oil price, the marginal costs of CO2 capture are 
higher than the benefits from incremental oil recovery and so it is more economical to lower the capture rate. As these 
contingent decisions will made by different entities owning and operating the different parts of the CCS-EOR value 
chain, the contract terms should provide incentives to each entity such that they adjust their operations to optimize the 
overall project value. Evaluating alternate contract types, we find that the risk-sharing offered by the indexed price 
contracts give incentives to each entity to optimize the CO2 capture rate in response to the change in the oil price. On 
the other hand, the fixed price contracts would result in a sub-optimal project value as the power plant company does 
not bear any oil price risk and thus has no incentive to reduce the CO2 capture rate. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the integrated CCS-EOR project we study in this paper and 
calculates the cash-flows generated by each component of the integrated project. In Section 3, we describe the key 
features of the commercial structures that link the individual entities in the value chain, and evaluate alternate 
commercial structures for the CCS-EOR project. In Section 4, we illustrate the importance of contingent decision-
making in optimizing the total project value , and evaluate alternate contract types  in terms of the incentives they 
provide to individual entities to optimize their operations. Finally, some conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
 
2. The CCS-EOR Project 
 
The CCS-EOR project analyzed in this paper is an integrated project with a coal-fired power plant with CO2 capture, 
a pipeline that transports the CO2, and an oil field that injects and subsequently stores the CO2 for EOR.  This is a 
dedicated project such that the power plant, the pipeline and the oil field are dependent on each other for the CO2 
capture/transport/injection. The specifications of each of the components of this project are described next. 
 
2.1. Project Description 
 
The power plant is a coal-fired integrated coal gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant designed to capture 90% of 
the CO2 generated. This is a baseload plant with a capacity factor of 80% and the heat rate is 10,000 Btu/kWh.  The CO2 
will be transported via a 20-inch, 50-mile dedicated pipeline to the oil field that has estimated 190 million barrels of oil 
reserves recoverable through EOR. It is estimated that it would take 25 years to recover the total oil recoverable. The 
project construction is planned to begin in 2017, the operations will start in 2020 and continue for 25 years till 2044.  
Every year the 3.2 million tons of CO2 that will be captured at the power plant is planned to be injected in the oil 
field. Some of this injected CO2 will come to the surface with the oil and will be recycled and injected back into the oil 
field. The rate of CO2 recycling (expressed as a % of the total CO2 injected in the previous year that comes to the 
surface and is injected back in the current year) is 0.05% in year 2021 and will increase to 60% by 2039 and then stay 
constant. The total CO2 injected in a year (Table 2: row b5) is the sum of the ‘new’ CO2 (from the power plant) and the 
recycled CO2 (Table 2: row b4). At the end of the project, the oil field will be closed and all of the CO2 injected will be 
permanently stored. 
The average EOR efficiency (oil recovered per ton of CO2 injected) in the oil field is estimated to increase from 1 
bbl/ton in year 2021 to 2 bbl/ton by 2031 and then fall again to 1bbl/ton by 2044. The annual oil production (Table 2: 
row b6) will increase till 2031 due to the increasing CO2 injection and EOR efficiency. From 2031 to 2039, the decrease 
in EOR efficiency offsets the increase in CO2 injection, and thus the annual oil production will be almost constant; the 
annual oil production will decrease after 2039.  Next, we describe the cash-flows involved in this CCS-EOR project. 
 
2.2. Project Cash-Flows 
 
Table 2 presents the project cash-flows (due to space constraints we just show an extract of the entire table). The 
parameters used to calculate these cash-flows are given in Table 1. All values in Table 1 remain constant in real terms 
through the project life and grow at an inflation rate of 3%. We use a nominal discount rate of 10% and tax rate of 35%. 
The first investment begins in 2017 with the start of power plant construction. The construction schedule and the 
investment cash-flows for the power plant are given in Table 2: rows a1, a2. This investment will get depreciated using 
a 20-year Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS). The pipeline construction schedule is: 40% in 2018 
and 60% in 2019, this investment is depreciated using a 15-year MACRS. Unlike the power plant and the pipeline, only 
part (60%) of the capital investment for EOR will be done upfront before the start of operations. This upfront 
investment involves the oil field upgrades such as constructing a CO2 spur-line from the main CO2 pipeline to the oil 
field, investment in the surface equipment such as a CO2 recycle plant. This investment (row b2) is depreciated as per a 
15-year MACRS. The remaining 40% capital investment involves drilling of the CO2 injection wells and the oil 
production wells, and will be done gradually (10% every 5 years starting in 2024) reflecting the temporal increase in the 
amount of CO2 injected and the oil produced.  This investment (row b9) has no salvage value and is expensed. Other 
costs incurred during the project involve the O&M costs (power plant: row a4; oil field: b7), the fuel cost (row a5), the 
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CO2 emission penalty (row a6), and the cost of CO2 recycling (row b8). There are two sources of revenue for this 
project: revenue from the electricity generation (row a8), and revenue from the oil production (row b11).  
 
Power Plant     
Overnight Cost [1] $/kW 6,900   
Fixed O&M Cost [5] $/kW/year 50   
Variable O&M Cost [5] mills/kWh 9   
Price of Coal $/MMBtu 2   
Penalty for CO2 Emissions $/ton 10   
Wholesale Electricity Price cents/kWh 10 
Oil Field     
Capital Investment [11] $/bbl 5   
O&M Cost [11] $/bbl 10   
CO2 Recycle Cost [11] $/ton 30   
Price of Oil Recovered $/bbl 70 
Royalty Payment (% of oil production value) 12.5% 
Pipeline     
Capital Investment [1] $million/mile 1.7   
O&M Costs [1] $/ton 2.5   
Table 1    Unit costs and prices used to calculate cash-flows (real values in 2010 dollars) 
 
    Year 
Row #   2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  2023  2024  ...2031 ...2044 
   Discount Factor  1.9 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.5 3.8 7.4 25.5 
  
 POWER PLANT                      
a1  Construction Schedule  20% 50% 30%               
a2  Overnight Costs  849 2,185 1,350               
a3  Depreciation  - - - 164 316 293 271 250 196 0 
a4  O&M Costs  - - - 76 78 81 83 86 105 155 
a5  Fuel (Coal) Costs  - - - 94 97 100 103 106 130 192 
a6  CO2 Emission Penalty  - - - 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.3 6.5 9.6 
a7  Total Expenses  - - - 339 497 478 462 447 438 356 
a8  Electricity Gen. Revenue  - - - 471 485 500 515 530 652 958 
a9  Total Income  - - - 132 -11 22 53 83 215 602 
a10  Tax  - - - 46 -4 8 19 29 75 211 
a11  Net Cash Flows  -849 -2,185 -1,350 250 309 307 305 304 335 392 
  Total Power Plant NPV = -$798 million       
  
 OIL FIELD                     
b1  Investment Schedule  - 30% 30%               
b2  Capital Investment  -      361      372               
b3  Depreciation  - - - 37 70 63 56 51 43 0 
b4  CO2 Recycled (m ton)  - - - - 0.002 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.5 4.7 
b5  Total CO2 Injected (m ton)  - - - 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.6 7.8 
b6  Amt. Oil Recovered (m bbl)  - - - - 3.2 3.6 4.1 4.6 9.9 7.8 
b7  O&M Costs  - - - - 44 52 60 69 185 214 
b8  CO2 Recycle Costs  - - - - 0.1 5 10 15 82 384 
b9  Drilling Costs  - - - - - - - 144 - - 
b10  Total Expenses  - - - 37 113 119 126 279 311 598 
b11  Oil Prod. Revenue  - - - - 306 361 420 485 1,296 1,499 
b12  Royalty  - - - - 38 45 53 61 162 187 
b13  Total Revenue  - - - - 268 316 368 424 1,134 1,311 
b14  Total Income  - - - -37 154 197 242 145 823 714 
b15  Tax  - - - -13 54 69 85 51 288 250 
b16  Net Cash Flows  - -361 -372 13 170 191 213 145 578 464 
 Total Oil Field NPV = $907 million               
  
 PIPELINE                      
  Total Pipeline NPV = -$74 million               
Table 2    Project Cash-Flows (in $million unless specified) 
 
Considering these project cash-flows, we see that the overall project has a net positive NPV of $35 million, but the 
power plant and the pipeline have a net negative NPV of -$798 million and -$74 million respectively. In the entire value 
chain, only the oil field generates a net positive NPV of $907 million. This is because as seen from Figure 1, the power 
plant bears the largest share of the project costs (64%), while the oil field captures the largest revenue share (53%). 
Note that these NPV calculations do not account for any cash-flow transfers between the involved entities. If 
separate companies were to own the individual components of the value chain then the aggregate project value would 
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need to be distributed through internal cash-flow transfers so that it is profitable for each company to go-ahead with the 
project. Commercial structures that link the different entities along the value chain would determine the value-sharing 
structure of the value chain; this will be discussed in detail in Section 3.  
 
                       
Figure 1    NPV of total costs and total revenue of the different components of the CCS-EOR value chain 
 
The cash-flows calculated in this section are based on the expected value of the economic variables as given in Table 
1. Next, we discuss how the project value might change in light of change in the exogenous market risk factors. 
 
2.3. Exogenous Market Risks and Ex-post Scenarios 
 
In this paper we analyze the impact of the exogenous market risks that might be realized after a major investment has 
been made specifically in the operational phase of the project from 2020 to 2044. These risk factors include the 
wholesale price of electricity, the price of coal, the price of oil recovered and the CO2 emission penalties. For 
illustration, we will analyze the impact of the change in the expected price of oil one year after the start of project 
operations (in 2021). Table 3 gives the ex-post NPV of the power plant, the oil field, the pipeline and the overall 
integrated project for different ex-post oil prices.  
 
 Price of Oil ($/bbl) 
  35 50 70 90 105 
Power Plant 1,133   1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 
Oil Field 382 745 1,229 1,712 2,075 
Pipeline -23 -23 -23 -23 -23 
Integrated Project 1,491 1,854 2,338 2,822 3,184 
Table 3    Ex-post NPV($million) of the indiviual components of the CCS-EOR chain for a range of ex-post oil prices 
 
We see that if the oil price dropped from $70/bbl to $35/bbl then there will be a loss of $847 million, but if the oil 
price increased to $105/bbl then the ex-post NPV will increase by $846 million. A change in the oil price would have a 
direct impact only on the EOR revenue and thus only the value of the oil field is affected; the NPV of the power plant 
and the pipeline do not change with the oil price. The commercial structure linking the involved entities would 
determine how the risks are shared among the involved entities and the resulting project value captured by each entity. 
This will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
3.  Commercial Structures for the CCS-EOR Value Chain 
 
In an integrated CCS project the different parts of the CCS value chain – CO2 capture, transport and storage, would 
be linked through a commercial structure. Commercial structures determine the ownership, financial and operating 
structure for the involved entities in the value chain. This paper focuses on an ownership structure such that the power 
plant and the oil field are owned by separate companies and the pipeline is jointly owned by the power plant company 
and the oil field company. If we only account for the externally generated cash-flows, based on the cash-flows 
calculated in Section 2.2, in this ownership structure the power plant company would have a negative NPV of -$835 
million and the oil field company would have a positive NPV of $870 million. Since this project is profitable on an 
aggregate basis, the commercial structure should specify a transfer of value from the oil field company to the power 
plant company such that it is profitable for each company to go-ahead with the project. 
Let us assume that both companies negotiate a price for the delivery of CO2. What is the guarantee that after the 
power plant company has built the power plant, the oil field company will not want to renegotiate and offer a lower 
price for the CO2 than agreed on earlier. Klein et al [9] and Williamson [13] talk about the risk of opportunistic 
behavior in transactions involving large upfront investments that are dedicated to a single buyer. The likelihood of ex-
post opportunism might make it unattractive to invest in this CCS-EOR project. Long-term contracts have been used by 
the electric utility industry for the coal supply [8] and the natural gas industry [3, 10] to provide protection from such 
opportunistic behavior. So, before any major investment is made, the companies involved in this CCS-EOR project 
would enter a long-term CO2 contract for the estimated project life. 
The long-term contracts linking the individual entities in the value chain should have two key features: 
Oil Field
35%
Pipeline
2%
Power Plant
63%
Total Costs (NPV) = $484 million
Power Plant
47%
Pipeline
0%
Oil Field
53%
Total Revenue (NPV) = $491 million
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1. Distribute the Project Value 
The contracts should distribute the aggregate project value between the individual entities such that it is profitable 
for each entity to go-ahead with the project. 
2. Distribute the Project Risk 
If the oil field company were to bear all the risk of the change in the oil price, then there might be a scenario wherein 
the oil price drops so low that it is no more profitable for the oil field company to operate as per the ex-ante negotiated 
contract terms. This uncertainty on the ex-post profitability of the contract terms is likely to reduce the overall 
attractiveness of this project and the project might not take-off at all or might be abandoned ex-post, even though it is 
overall profitable both ex-ante and ex-post [2]. Blitzer et al [2] through their study of contracts of oil exploration and 
development motivate that risk-sharing between the entities can help reduce the ex-post contracting risks and is 
mutually beneficial. Hence the contract terms should offer risk allocation among the involved entities such that it is 
profitable for each entity to continue with the operations even when the risk factors change ex-post.  
In this paper we evaluate the following two types of long-term contract structures: 
1. Fixed Price CO2 Contracts 
We evaluate alternate fixed price contracts where the CO2 contract price is pre-determined and remains fixed for the 
contract term. 
2. Indexed Price CO2 Contracts 
EPRI’s EOR scoping study [6] reports that often CO2 supply contracts between the Shell CO2 Co. (now Kinder 
Morgan) and the EOR operators index the CO2 supply costs to the oil price to reduce the EOR operator’s risk of low oil 
price. In this paper we evaluate alternate indexed price contracts which index the CO2 contract price to the oil price such 
that the contract price of CO2 ($/ton) = x% of the price of oil ($/bbl). 
Next, we evaluate these two contract types in light of value-sharing and risk-sharing between the involved entities. 
 
3.1. Value-Sharing Offered by Contracts 
 
Figure 2 shows the value-sharing between the power plant company and the oil field company at different contract 
prices of CO2. The x-axis gives the contract price per ton CO2 for the two contract types: a) fixed price contracts ($), 
and b) indexed price contracts (% expected price of oil (=$70/bbl)). 
 
Figure 2    NPV($million) of the involved companies under alternate contract terms 
 
The total project value is $35 million and dependent on the contract price of CO2, each individual entity’s share of 
the total project value changes. The NPV of the power plant company will be negative for a contract price less than $62 
(or 89% of the price of oil) per ton CO2, and as the contract price of CO2 increases the power plant company’s share of 
total project value increases. At a contract price of $64 (or 96% of the price of oil) per ton CO2, the power plant 
company captures 77% of the total project value. The oil field company would not pay more than $64 (or 91% of the oil 
price) per ton CO2, as a higher price would result in a negative NPV for the oil field company. Hence we find that for 
both companies to go-ahead with this project, the contract price per ton CO2 should be between $62 - $64 for the fixed 
price contracts, and 89%-91% of the oil price for the indexed price contracts. 
These contract terms are calculated based on the expected value of the oil price. But, ex-post if the price of oil 
changes, the project value captured by each company would depend on how the risk is shared among the involved 
companies. In the next section we analyze the risk allocation offered by these two alternate contract types and identify 
the contract terms that would be desirable to both companies ex-post.  
 
3.2. Risk-Sharing Offered by Contracts 
 
To find out if the ex-ante negotiated contract terms would also be profitable to both companies when the oil price 
changes, we analyze the same ex-post scenario as in Section 2.3 – the oil price changes in 2021. Figure 3 gives the ex-
post NPV of the two companies at the minimum contract price of CO2 that both companies would agree to ex-ante i.e. 
$62 for the fixed price contracts (Figure 3a) and 89% of the oil price for the indexed price contracts (Figure 3b).  
$14
$27$35
$22
$8
$0.2
62 63 64
Contract Price (per ton CO2)
Power Plant Co. Oil Field Co.NPV ($million)
Negative NPV for 
the oil field co.
Negative NPV for 
the power plant co.
Fixed Price ($) 62 6463
Indexed Price 
(% price of oil) 89
9190
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                a. Fixed price contract @ $62/ton                              b. Indexed price contract @89% of oil price/ton 
Figure 3    Ex-post NPV($million) of the involved companies under alternate contract terms 
 
We see that for either of the contract types, if ex-post the expected price of oil did not change ($70/bbl) or increased, 
then both companies would continue to have a net positive NPV. But, if the price of oil dropped ex-post, then we see 
from Figure 3a that under the fixed price contracts the oil field company would have a negative NPV and thus would 
not be able to afford even the minimum price of CO2 it offered to pay ex-ante to the power plant company. This is 
because the oil field company bears all the oil price risk as the power plant company is always guaranteed a fixed price 
for the CO2.This uncertainty on the ex-post profitability of the contract terms is likely to discourage investment in this 
project even though it is profitable on an aggregate level both ex-ante and ex-post [2]. 
Using the indexed price contracts can reduce the likelihood of the ex-post dissatisfaction with the contract terms– we 
see from Figure 3b that if the price of oil fell to $50/bbl then this indexed price contract would still be profitable to both 
companies. Thus the indexed price contracts reduce the risk of ex-post insolvency by distributing the oil price risk 
between the two companies – we see from Figure 3b that unlike in the case of the fixed price contracts, in the indexed 
price contracts the NPV of the power plant company is sensitive to the oil price. But, if the oil price dropped very low to 
$35/bbl, then the oil field company would have a net negative NPV even under this contract. 
An important consideration we have not accounted for so far is the contingent decisions made by the project 
operators in response to the change in the risk factors. As risk factors such as the oil price change, the operators might 
re-optimize their operating decisions. In the next section we analyze the impact of contingent decision-making on the 
NPV of the overall project and identify the contract terms that will incentivize optimal contingent decisions. 
 
4. Contingent Decision-Making 
 
The project operators will make contingent decisions to adjust the project operations in response to the change in risk 
factors. The optimal contingent decisions are such that the overall project value is maximized. To illustrate the 
significance of contingent decision-making, we analyze the decision to adjust the rate of CO2 capture and injection 
contingent on the price of oil. The optimal capture rate depends on the marginal costs and benefits of CO2 capture and 
injection. These include the O&M costs, the incremental oil recovery and the avoided CO2 emission penalty - modeled 
earlier in Section 2. Another significant cost of CO2 capture is the energy penalty of applying the capture process to the 
power generation. MIT’s Future of Coal study [12] reports that adding 90% pre-combustion capture to an IGCC plant 
leads to a 7.2 percentage point reduction in the generating efficiency compared to a plant without capture. Keeping the 
coal feed constant, this translates into approximately 25% decrease in the power output – we assume that 10% comes 
from the CO2 compression and the rest 15% is the energy penalty of the water-gas shift reaction and the CO2 separation. 
The IGCC power plant in this project is designed to have dynamically adjustable CO2 capture rate that can be 
changed in response to the fluctuating risk factors. We recognize that there is uncertainty on the technically recoverable 
energy penalty as the capture rate is dynamically reduced from 90% to 0%, and the subsequent increase in the net power 
output can be between 10% (compression penalty) and 25% (theoretical maximum). Figure 4 presents the net power 
output as a function of the CO2 capture rate for alternate levels of increase in the net power output. The curve for the 
10% gain is linear reflecting only the change in the CO2 compression rate; other curves have a kink at the 60% capture 
rate. This is because we assume that larger energy gains occur as the capture rate is reduced from 90% to 60% and 
thereafter lowering the capture rate does not yield as much energy gains. For analysis purpose, in this paper we use the 
20% curve i.e. there is a 20% increase in the net power output by reducing CO2 capture rate from 90% to 0%. 
 
4.1. Optimization of the Overall Integrated Project Value 
 
We analyze the same ex-post scenario as in Section 2.3 and Section 3.2 – price of oil changes in 2021, and calculate 
the ex-post NPV of the overall integrated project at different levels of CO2 capture. Figure 5 gives the ex-post NPV of 
the overall integrated project at different capture rates for ex-post price of oil ranging from $20-$45/bbl. The black dots 
indicate the optimal capture rate at which the NPV is the maximum for a given ex-post oil price. 
We see that if the price of oil is lower than $45/bbl, it is economical to lower the CO2 capture rate from the design 
90%. The optimal CO2 capture rate is 30% at the oil price of $20/bbl, and by adjusting the capture rate from 90% to  
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Figure 4    Net power output at different levels of the CO2 capture rate 
 
 
Figure 5    Ex-post NPV($million) of the integrated project at different CO2 capture rates and different oil prices 
 
30%, the overall project NPV increases by $156 million. This is because at a low oil price, the marginal costs of CO2 
capture are higher than the benefits from the incremental oil recovery and so it is more economical to do partial capture. 
This scenario illustrates the importance of contingent decision-making in maximizing the overall project value. As 
these contingent decisions will often be made by independent entities owning and operating different parts of the value 
chain, the contract terms linking the individual entities should be such that each entity has incentives to optimize the 
integrated project value. This is discussed in detail next. 
 
4.2. Incentives Offered by Contracts 
 
 In Section 3, we had discussed that contract terms should be structured such that they offer profitable value-sharing 
and risk-sharing between the individual entities. A third important consideration in determining the contract terms 
between the involved entities is to provide incentives for optimal contingent decision-making such that the overall 
project value is maximized. Blitzer et al [2] and Hall et al [7] talk about the importance of structuring the contracts such 
that the contracts provide incentives to the individual entities’ to perform in the common interest. We evaluate the two 
contract types as analyzed in Section 3.3 to see whether they provide incentives to the power plant company and the oil 
field company to adjust the CO2 capture rate when ex-post the oil price drops to $35/bbl. Figure 6 gives the ex-post 
NPV of both companies for two alternate contract types at two different levels of CO2 capture: 90% capture (as 
designed) and 60% capture (optimal CO2 capture rate at $35/bbl: from Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 6 Ex-post NPV($million) of the involved companies at different CO2 capture rates under alternate contract terms 
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We see that under the fixed price CO2 contract, it would be economical for the oil field company to operate at the 
optimal 60% capture rate, but there is a conflict of interest with the power plant company for which it is more 
economical to continue at 90% CO2 capture. This is because the power plant company gets paid a fixed price for the 
CO2 and thus has no incentive to lower the capture rate. On the other hand, under the indexed price contract we see that 
it would be economical for both companies to lower the capture rate to the optimal 60%. This is because in the indexed 
price contracts, both companies share the oil price risk and have incentives to lower the rate of CO2 capture and 
injection at a low oil price. By lowering the CO2 capture rate to the optimal 60% rate, the power plant company and the 
oil field company gain $19 million and $27 million respectively and the overall project value is also maximized. 
Thus, in a low oil price environment the indexed price contract optimizes the value of the overall integrated project 
and the fixed price contract would result in a sub-optimal integrated project value. Another thing to note from Figure 6 
is that under the indexed price contract terms both companies now have a net positive NPV even at $35/bbl. Thus, the 
indexed price contracts along with contingent decision-making not only provide incentives to the individual entities to 
maximize the overall project value, but also minimize the risk of ex-post insolvency and dissatisfaction with the ex-ante 
negotiated contract terms.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we evaluate alternate commercial structures for an integrated CCS-EOR project where the source of 
CO2 is a coal-fired power plant, and the CO2 is transported via a dedicated pipeline to an oil field where the CO2 is 
injected for EOR. We evaluate alternative contract types that link the involved entities in light of exogenous market 
risks, such as the fluctuating price of oil recovered. The choice of the contract type determines who would bear the risks 
along the value chain, and the incentives that the risk allocation produces fixes the total project value. We see that the 
fixed price contracts have weaknesses in terms of ex-post insolvencies and poor incentive structures that result in a sub-
optimal decision-making by the involved entities. The risk-sharing offered by the indexed price contracts reduces the 
likelihood of ex-post insolvency and provides incentives to each entity to optimize the total project value. 
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